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Integrating, Fragmenting, or Accidentally Socializing? e Possible Futures of Asian Regionalism
In their comprehensive edited volume Integrating Re-
gions: Asia in Comparative Context, Miles Kahler and An-
drewMacIntyre bring together a number of leading inter-
national scholars to evaluate and explain “the new Asian
regionalism and its institutions in the context of other re-
gions and their international architecture” (p. 4). is is
both a timely and an ambitious project. e work is di-
vided into three parts: the ﬁrst discusses the design of re-
gional institutions; the second explores regional compar-
isons with Latin America and Europe; and the third ex-
amines whether Asia is experiencing the epiphany of re-
gional convergence. Kahler provides a thoughtful intro-
duction to the volume, while MacIntyre and John Raven-
hill conclude, somewhat provisionally, about the possi-
ble future of Asian regional institutions. As Kahler notes
and most of the scholars in the volume acknowledge, in-
stitutional design varies across regional arrangements in
Europe, Latin America, and East and Southeast Asia. As
Kahler further observes, “contemporary Europe has too
oen served as a benchmark for Asian institutions” (p.
9).
Importantly, then, this volume acknowledges that de-
spite superﬁcial similarities, the character of regional in-
stitutions diﬀer enormously, and it is important not to
assume, as many scholars have, that regional arrange-
ments in Asia will necessarily follow a Eurocentric de-
velopmental trajectory. A number of contingent factors
account for these variations, including historical experi-
ence; economic and political complementarities; the role
of external hegemons, particularly the United States; and
the nature and sequencing of regional crises. Randall C.
Henning, notably, explores the oen productive causal
links between economic crises and regional institution
building, while Kevin O’Rourke draws aention to the
contingent play of political and historical factors that led
to the European Union (EU) model, ultimately triumph-
ing over the looser and economically more open Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) from 1960 to 1972.
More particularly, the nature of decision rules, com-
mitment devices like legalization and enfranchisement,
and membership rules profoundly aﬀects the practice of
these regional institutions. Indeed, to a large extent,
Kahler and a number of other contributors to the volume,
notably, Judith G. Kelley, Stephen Haggard, and Jorge
I. Dominguez, argue that institutional design explains
the very diﬀerent constitutional and economic structures
that have evolved and currently prevail in Latin Amer-
ica, Europe, and East and Southeast Asia. us, Kelley
demonstrates how membership rules, namely, whether
organizations function as “convoys or clubs,” inﬂuence
the organizations’ “ability to accommodate heterogene-
ity and forge successful regional integration” (p. 79).
Kelley contends that the EU, over time, emphasized club
membership rules. is gave it more tools to leverage
members, oﬀer various levels of inclusiveness, and re-
duce heterogeneity in the interests of common political
and economic union. By contrast, convoy arrangements,
like ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations),
ASEAN Plusree (APT), Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooper-
ation (APEC), and the East Asian Summit (EAS) mecha-
nism, that oﬀer nonbinding consensus based on suppos-
edly shared norms, “cannot use the tools that clubs can,”
basically because they set very low standards for join-
ing and have lile ability to enforce their agreements (p.
96). us while club arrangements can use the tools of
convoys, like granting associational status or permiing
diﬀerent speeds of economic and political integration or
a variable geometry, the so law, convoy arrangement
cannot deploy the hard rules of clubs. As a consequence,
clubs like the EU have a capacity to reduce heterogeneity
between member states. By contrast, Haggard, following
a new institutionalist perspective, argues that the “most
general constraint on institutionalization is the hetero-
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geneity of the countries of the Paciﬁc Rim” (p. 198). Such
heterogeneity, and the drive to widen institutions, has
had a negative impact on institutional deepening. More-
over, a so law regime within the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) and across APEC and the EAS, as Haggard
notes, “weakens both precision and the binding nature of
commitments” (p. 214). Indeed, as the Australian Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry warned, “less can be more
[because] while ASEAN, APT, APEC, ARF [ASEAN Re-
gional Forum] and the EAS are all potentially useful re-
gional bodies, their mutual existence has the real poten-
tial to result in duplication of eﬀort and dilute outcomes
for both businesses and countries in our region” (p. 98).
In a similar vein, Eric Voeten notes that Asia signif-
icantly diﬀers from other regions in the absence of “re-
gional judicial institutions” and this constitutes a strik-
ing anomaly in East and Southeast Asian aempts at eco-
nomic integration when compared with regional group-
ings elsewhere (p. 58). Voeten, in a dense and detailed
study, observes that ASEAN states are not necessarily
averse to using international courts to sele territorial
disputes. However, they have demonstrated lile enthu-
siasm for establishing regional dispute resolution mech-
anisms. Voeten concludes that “simply put, the demand
for an Asian judicial institution will remain weak un-
til Asian states adopt legally binding treaties that create
rights and obligations for private persons” (p. 73).
Somewhat diﬀerently, Dominguez, in his insightful
survey of seven South American regional institutions,
ﬁnds that three factors have an impact on their sustain-
ability. Firstly, domestic politics maer, notably, the
part played by inter-presidential agreements in secur-
ing institutional stability. Secondly, business responds
to opportunities oﬀered by trade liberalization. irdly,
and perhaps most interestingly, “where inter-state peace
had been established before creating a regional economic
arrangement (North American Free Trade Association
NAFTA), or where such an association was an outcome
simultaneous with peace building (Southern Common
Market MERCOSUR) the resulting economic arrange-
ments proved more eﬀective at both peace and trade” (p.
108). By contrast, Dominguez found that “regime homo-
geneity or heterogeneity and various structural asymme-
tries did not account for variation between the cases” (p.
110). Indeed, what ultimately counts for Dominguez in
terms of growth, peace, and integration are “the rules
that ever worked, namely trade liberalization and central
bank payment clearing” (p. 123). In the most success-
ful South American case, MERCOSUR, comprising the
southern cone of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay,
and Venzuela, Dominguez contends that the organization
has been light on institutionalization and depended on
relations between presidents, not on supranational orga-
nization. Ultimately, South America’s “most successful
economic agreement emerged from a multi-year, multi-
faceted self reinforcing process of conﬁdence and peace
building in the southern cone” (p. 129). Yet as Dominguez
warns, “Readers Beware! ere is much in the Latin
American story that should not be emulated. Domestic
politics and policy errors may trump gains from regional
economic integration” (p. 110). Certainly, there is much
in the Latin American cases, particularly the inﬂuence
exercised by domestic coalitions to deﬂect liberalization
initiatives, that has relevance to ASEAN’s aempts to
forge an integrated economic community.
ere is, one suspects, much less for ASEAN to learn
fromEuropean aempts at union. As Kevin O’Rourke ex-
plains, Franco-German rapprochement, dating from the
mid-1950s, drove Europe’s supranational approach to in-
tegration and reﬂected three key variables: the historical
experience of the western European states, particularly,
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom aer 1815;
the geopolitical and economic interests of post-1945 na-
tional governments; and the role of chance and contin-
gency in this distinctively European paern of develop-
ment. “ere was nothing inevitable about the develop-
ment of supranational institutions in Europe” (p. 164).
Indeed, O’Rourke, who is a historian rather than a polit-
ical scientist, pays conspicuous aention to the role that
chance and political actors like Robert Schumann, Jean
Monet, Konrad Adenauer, Charles De Gaulle, and Harold
Macmillan, as well as external pressure from successive
U.S. administrations, played in forging the EU at the ex-
pense of an open and more market driven European Free
Trade Area, the initial preference of the UK Conservative
Party in 1960. As O’Rourke shows, the deepened and
widened union aer 1972 succeeded as a direct conse-
quence of British diplomatic incompetence adumbrated
by Harold Macmillan’s, the British prime minister, re-
markable volte-face in applying for European Economic
Community (EEC) membership in 1961. As O’Rourke
prudently concludes, “historians are more comfortable
inhabiting a world in which multiple motivations may
maer at diﬀerent levels of the political process” (p. 168).
Given the role chance played in European developments,
O’Rourke sees lile utility in applying or even compar-
ing the European process with Asian regionalism. Asia is
a geographically larger and far more politically and eco-
nomically diverse region than Europe, and the “historical
context is completely diﬀerent.” In particular, “Asia is not
a declining giant which feels the need to unite against
rising threats from the rest of the world” (ibid.). Host to
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the “rising giants” of the twenty-ﬁrst century, China and
India, it is hard to see either of these countries ceding
sovereignty to a regional supranational arrangement or
even accepting the decisional framework of amultilateral
body.
ese historical, geopolitical, and social facts
notwithstanding, a number of authors in this collection
aempt to make the case that regionalism could trans-
form the political and economic conduct of Southeast
and East Asian states. Amitav Acharaya and Simon Hix
make the case that shared norms and regional institu-
tions may socialize states into less self-interested modes
of behavior and create conditions for a shared sense of
regional identity. Hix recognizes that “a particular and
potentially unique set of factors came together in the
mid 1980s in Western Europe to create the environment”
for regional economic integration, nevertheless he spec-
ulates that “although the level of political, economic and
ideological convergence” is lower in Asia, something
analogous could occur (pp. 18, 56). To demonstrate
this, Hix argues that East Asian states could converge on
deeper economic integration and agree to “delegate cer-
tain agenda-seing powers to an independent agent” (p.
46). In this context, Hix further contends that East Asia
might “learn a lot from the experience of the design of
representation in the EU” and posits a somewhat fanci-
ful scheme of qualiﬁed majority voting that might apply
to a putative East Asian Economic Union (p. 48). He
concludes, somewhat optimistically, that “if a group of
states in East Asia could start the ball rolling, economic
integration beyond a free trade area could be a genuine
prospect for the region” (p. 57).
Meanwhile, Acharaya, adopting a constructivist
methodology, which has become something of an ortho-
doxy among scholars of international relations in Asia
and Australia, asserts that “regions are social constructs”
whose eﬀectiveness depends on a “socially constructed
identity.” Consequently, regions are not “preordained,
permanent or changeless” (p. 223). e problem here is
that such statements are worryingly unfalsiﬁable. Every-
thing is possibly a region if members believe they belong
to one, ergo, nothing is plausibly a region. We are further
informed that “normative convergence” is the key to the
success of regional institutions (p. 224). Consequently,
the success of Asian institutions should be measured in
“ideational, social and normative terms” rather than any-
thing structural or empirically testable, like, for instance,
regional trade and market integration, common defense
arrangements, open borders, movement toward currency
union, or the acceptance of legally binding supranational
institutions (p. 224). Given that no such developments
have occurred within ASEAN or in the wider APT, it
is hardly surprising that constructivists prefer ideational
factors in Asian regional development. Acharaya fur-
ther contends that the distinctive feature of regionalism
in East and Southeast Asia is its “contingent socializa-
tion” (p. 231). In contrast, constructivists generally ar-
gue that the process of socialization moves, over time,
from a calculation of instrumental beneﬁts gained or re-
ceived by a member to an internalization of “values, roles
and understandings.”[1] Acharaya argues that Asia dis-
ports a third type of socialization where “agents act both
instrumentally and normatively, concurrently and on a
more or less permanent basis” (p. 230). is lumps to-
gether rather than splits or diﬀerentiates the practices
whereby new states engage with regional arrangements
like ASEAN, the APT, and the EAS. Acharaya’s case stud-
ies of Vietnam, India, and China, where newcomers to
regional arrangements neither backtrack nor fully com-
mit, adds lile to our understanding of such “contingent
socialization,” which sounds like special pleading rather
than analytic insight. Moreover, given that the norms
that inﬂuence Asia’s socialization are those of “domes-
tic non-interference and regional autonomy,” this obfus-
cates rather than clariﬁes the status of Asian norm con-
vergence (p. 234). If member states share only the belief
in noninterference in the domestic political, economic, or
legal aﬀairs of member states, this renders the prospect of
regionalism somewhat redundant. No wonder construc-
tivists place such emphasis on shared ideas as there is lit-
tle else to show for almost ﬁy years of ASEAN inspired
regionalism.
In their conclusion, by contrast, Ravenhill and Mac-
Intyre demonstrate that Asian regionalism possesses a
largely protean character. Despite the proliferation of re-
gional bodies, meetings, and agreements since the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), integration remains curi-
ously inchoate. us, “conventional indicators of trade
and ﬁnancial interdependence provide no support for ar-
guments that increasing economic integration has driven
the new Asian regionalism” (p. 250). Moreover, the pro-
liferation of Preferential Trade Agreements between var-
ious states in the region and with trading partners out-
side the region reﬂects political-strategic considerations
rather than economic or business ones. is, in turn, re-
ﬂects the close and oen opaque business-government
relations at the state level that prevail across the re-
gion. Meanwhile, “the relatively low levels of intra-
regional trade in Asia generate few pressures for mon-
etary integration” (p. 256). MacIntyre and Ravenhill ul-
timately maintain, therefore, that the “central dynamic
shaping the evolution of Asian regional institutions” are
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“international political and security rivalries” (p. 263).
In this context, Barack Obama’s much vaunted pivot to
Asia and the United States’ recent proposal of a Trans-
Paciﬁc Partnership, which directly conﬂicts with the
APT-sponsored Regional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership, not only reﬂects the competing Chinese and U.S.
visions of the region, but also intimates the fragmented
nature of Asian regionalism that will aﬀect all aempts
at integration for some time to come.
is volume then oﬀers much upon which to ponder
about the distinctive character of regional institutions
that currently aﬀect global politics. Moreover, given the
diversity of the regional arrangements discussed in this
volume, it is probably more accurate to speak of region-
alisms rather than any uniform paern of regionalism.
Two facts, however, emerge strongly. Firstly, states mat-
ter and secondly domestic interests, as well as architec-
tural design, structurally determine the regional arrange-
ments that emerge. is then is an original work and
its various chapters open a potentially interesting debate
about the complex and paradoxical character of Asian re-
gionalism. In this context, it is somewhat surprising that
there is nomention of the China-sponsored Shanghai Co-
operation and lile aention to the problematic impact
of China’s rise on Asian security. e volume could also
have been enhanced by a glossary of acronyms in such
an acronym rich environment. Finally, O’Rourke’s bi-
ographical details do not appear in the volume and the
work would have beneﬁted generally from more aen-
tive proof reading.
Note
[1]. Alistair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in
International Relations 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008), 21.
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